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Abstract We assess the robustness of previous findings on the determinants of terrorism.
Using extreme bound analysis, the three most comprehensive terrorism datasets, and focus-
ing on the three most commonly analyzed aspects of terrorist activity, i.e., location, victim,
and perpetrator, we re-assess the effect of 65 proposed correlates. Evaluating around 13.4
million regressions, we find 18 variables to be robustly associated with the number of in-
cidents occurring in a given country-year, 15 variables with attacks against citizens from a
particular country in a given year, and six variables with attacks perpetrated by citizens of a
particular country in a given year.
Keywords Causes of terrorism · Poverty and terrorism · Panel estimations · Extreme
bounds analysis
JEL Classification D74 · F51 · F52 · H56 · K42
1 Introduction
Why? Why us? Heinous terrorist attacks create an urge to understand the causes of terrorism.
Insights can be gained by examining the correlates of terrorism at the country level. The
tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the recent wave of terrorist attacks have triggered
a vast amount of empirical research in this vein. However, only very few robust findings
have emerged so far and there is no consensus on the causes of terrorism. Previous studies
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differ along various dimensions, most notably the set of explanatory variables, the terror
dataset used, the estimation technique, the period considered, and the aspect of terrorism
analyzed. Therefore, it is difficult to weed out contradictions and inconsistencies.
This paper takes stock of the literature and re-assesses the effect of most suggested vari-
ables using a consistent set of data and methods. We apply extreme bound analysis (EBA)
as suggested by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) and modified by Sala-i-
Martin (1997) to test the robustness of 65 proposed correlates. We estimate the effects using
the three most comprehensive datasets (ITERATE, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)) and focusing on the three key
aspects (location, victim, and perpetrator) of terrorism. This exercise yields results on two
fronts: First, it allows us to find truly robust correlates—if there are any. Second, it reveals
the reasons behind the contradictions in the current literature. In this way, the paper provides
policy relevant information and helps to place future research in the field on a firmer base.
Evaluating around 6.8 million regressions with the number of terrorist attacks occurring
in a particular country and year, we find that economic freedom, physical integrity rights,
law and order, and infant mortality rates are negatively associated with terrorism, while pop-
ulation, military expenditures and personnel, internal and internationalized internal wars,
guerrilla wars, strikes, government fractionalization, urbanization, foreign portfolio invest-
ments, OECD membership, political proximity to the United States as well as religious and
ethnic tensions are positively associated with the occurrence of terrorism.
Around 4.5 million regressions with the number of terrorist attacks against citizens from
a particular country reveal a similar set of robust correlates: Economic freedom, physical
integrity rights, primary goods exports, large population shares of young people, are nega-
tively related to terrorism—GDP per capita, population, military expenditures, internal and
internationalized internal wars, guerrilla wars, OECD membership, political proximity to
the United States, and religious and ethnic tension are positively related to terrorism.
Finally, a relatively small number of variables are robustly associated with the number of
terrorist attacks perpetrated by the citizens of a particular country. According to around 2.2
million regressions, these are economic freedom, physical integrity rights, and the number of
telephone mainlines (all negatively associated) as well as internationalized wars and centrist
governments (positively associated).
The short list of robust correlates implies that some of the findings are specific to the
context—the dataset, the empirical model or both. Significant determinants in plausible and
well-specified models turn insignificant when faced with the rigors of being tested alongside
many other plausible variables.
However, four caveats are in order. First, some variables may fail our test because they
are poor proxies for otherwise strong theories of terrorism. Second, for some of the theo-
ries put to the test, some of the variables in the vector of controls are “bad controls,” i.e.,
some of the variables might just as well be outcome or mediator variables in the notional
experiment at hand (Angrist and Pischke 2009: 64–69). Third, our empirical setup forces us
to restrict ourselves to reduced form estimations. Thus we cannot account for any structural
relationships. Finally, some of the regressors are arguably endogenous because of omitted
variables, simultaneity, measurement errors in regressors or sample selection bias. The re-
sulting inconsistencies may affect the parameter estimates for all variables in the model.1
Where does all this leave us? On the positive side, our analysis uncovers some truly robust
correlates. These correlates should prominently feature in future theoretical and empirical
1See, e.g., Hoover and Perez (2004) for a critique of the EBA.
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work on terrorism. On the negative side, our results show just how sensitive are some of the
previously reported results. Empirical research on terrorism would greatly gain, therefore,
if empirical models are rigorously justified and if the robustness of results is systematically
assessed.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature to set
the stage for the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the details of the empirical method
and Sect. 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
Empirical terrorism research is a growth industry. A comprehensive literature review is,
therefore, beyond the scope of this paper.2 Instead, we outline the main lines of research in
the field.3
A long-standing question concerns the relationship between terrorism and democracy
(among others, Crenshaw 1981; Sandler 1995; Enders and Sandler 2006a). Two oppos-
ing views have been put forward. On the one hand, the intrinsic freedoms and respect for
civil liberties of democratic societies are enabling and permissive factors providing a favor-
able environment for terrorism. On the other hand, democracies allow dissenters to express
their grievances by legal and peaceful means. There are, thus, two countervailing effects
of democracy: Democracy lowers the direct costs of waging terrorist campaigns, but at the
same time increases relative costs (Frey and Luechinger 2003).
In a pioneering study, Eubank and Weinberg (1994) took these competing hypotheses to
the data. They found that democracies are more likely to harbor terrorist groups than au-
tocracies. However, the number of terrorist groups is a poor measure for terrorist activity
and prone to reporting bias (e.g., Sandler 1995). According to two follow-up studies (Eu-
bank and Weinberg 2001; Weinberg and Eubank 1998), there is a positive or a U-shaped
relationship between the degree of democracy and the number of terrorist incidents in a
country if incidents are assigned to countries based on the location of the incidence, a pos-
itive relationship if incidents are assigned to countries based on nationality of victims and
an inverted U-shaped relationship if incidents are assigned to countries based on nationality
of perpetrators. These results highlight two important ideas. First, it is important to differ-
entiate between location- and perpetrator-aspects of terrorism (see also Basuchoudhary and
Shughart 2010). Arguably, the enabling and permissive factors of democracy are relevant
regarding where an attack takes place while the factors of political access are relevant re-
garding who resorts to terrorism. Second, given the countervailing factors of democracy, the
relationship between terrorism and democracy may well be non-linear.
Of the 43 studies reviewed for this paper, 40 include some measure of democracy (e.g.,
Blomberg and Hess 2008b; Blomberg and Rosendorff 2009; Drakos and Gofas 2006b;
Eyerman 1998; Li 2005; Piazza 2008b), political rights (e.g., Abadie 2006) or civil liberties
(e.g., Krueger and Laitin 2008; Krueger and Maleckova 2003). Taking a broad-brush view,
terrorism seems to be positively associated with democracy in studies on terror-locations and
2For an overview and further references on the economics of terrorism, see, e.g., Sandler and Enders (2004,
2008), Enders and Sandler (2006a), Frey et al. (2007), Enders (2007), Krueger (2007), Sandler and Arce
(2007), Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) and Shughart (2011).
3In a working paper version of this paper, we report the details such as sample period and size, terrorist
indicator and dataset, estimation technique, and main findings of 43 studies (Gassebner and Luechinger 2011;
Table A1).
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negatively in studies on perpetrators. However, there are a number of studies with contradic-
tory findings and many others find no significant relationship at all. Several studies model
non-linear effects by including squared terms. Since the usual test statistics are invalid for
interaction terms and, thus, squared terms in non-linear regressions such as negative bino-
mial regressions (Ai and Norton 2003; Greene 2010), it is not straightforward to interpret
these results. Exceptions are Abadie (2006) and Goldstein (2005) who find evidence for a
U-shaped relationship between political rights and terrorism risk using linear models.
A widely held belief by academics, politicians, and journalists alike holds that terror-
ism is rooted in economic grievances (for references, see Krueger and Maleckova 2003).
For example, President Bush (2002) explained at a U.N. development conference: “We fight
poverty because hope is an answer to terror”. President Obama (cited in The Economist
2010) concurs: “Extremely poor societies [. . .] provide optimal breeding grounds for dis-
ease, terrorism and conflict.” In the wake of the suicide attack on Moscow airport on January
24, 2011, President Medvedev (2011) similarly argued: “We must do everything possible to
influence [. . .] the socioeconomic roots of terrorism: poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and
orphanhood, and to ensure that global development becomes stable, secure and fair.”
Current evidence based on measures of economic development such as GDP and
GDP per capita (e.g., Abadie 2006; Berman and Laitin 2008; Blomberg and Hess 2008a;
Blomberg and Rosendorff 2009; Tavares 2004), the UN human development index (e.g.,
Bravo and Dias 2006; Piazza 2006), poverty indices (e.g., Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006),
literacy and school enrollment rates (e.g., Blomberg and Hess 2008a; Krueger and Malec-
kova 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006), infant mortality rates and life expectancy (e.g.,
Drakos and Gofas 2006a; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006), calorie intake and telephone main-
lines (e.g., Lai 2007; Piazza 2006) offers only weak support for this hypothesis. Studies
that account for attack location and victim identities find—with a few exceptions—either no
association or a positive association between economic development and terrorism. More
encouraging are studies looking at perpetrators. Several studies document a negative rela-
tionship between a country’s state of economic development and the number of attacks per-
petrated by its citizens. But again, some studies report opposite findings and a large number
of studies report non-results.
There are many variations on the theme. First, economic grievances due to changes
in economic activity (GDP growth, contraction periods) (e.g., Blomberg et al. 2004;
Krueger and Laitin 2008), unemployment rates (e.g., Feldmann and Perälä 2004; Gold-
stein 2005) or inflation (e.g., Feldmann and Perälä 2004) may be important for terror-
ism. Second, inequality may matter (e.g., Abadie 2006; Piazza 2006). Third, social safety
nets and redistributive policies at the national level and aid at the international level
may alleviate grievances and, thus, reduce terrorism (e.g., Azam and Delacroix 2006;
Azam and Thelen 2008; Burgoon 2006; Crenshaw et al. 2007; Neumayer and Plümper 2009;
Robison et al. 2006). Fourth, economic regulation may protect the interest of insiders at
the cost of reducing opportunities for outsiders (e.g., Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010;
Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006; Piazza 2008b). Fifth, globalization may break up exist-
ing structures and thereby provide new opportunities for formerly excluded groups (e.g.,
Blomberg and Hess 2008b; Blomberg and Rosendorff 2009; Li and Schaub 2004). Finally,
similar to other forms of political violence, terrorism may be related to an abundance of
natural resources (Sambanis 2008; Tavares 2004).
Only a few of these hypotheses are borne out by the data. There is a very clear and ro-
bust negative relationship between terrorism and globalization. Open countries are, ceteris
paribus, less prone to terrorist attacks and their citizens are less likely to be victims or per-
petrators of terrorist attacks. In studies on terror-locations, there is contested evidence for a
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negative relationship between welfare policies and terrorism (Burgoon 2006; Crenshaw et al.
2007) and some evidence for the resource curse hypothesis. Studies of perpetrator countries
provide conflicting evidence regarding aid and some evidence for a negative relationship
between terrorism and economic freedoms.
The positive association between urbanization and terrorism documented in several stud-
ies is little surprising for scholars of terrorism. It has long been observed that urbanization
is conducive to terrorism (Crenshaw 1981).
Aspects of demography and ethnicity also feature prominently in the literature. Trivially,
large countries provide many targets and a larger pool of potential victims and perpetra-
tors. Thus, population size is consistently positively correlated with terrorism. Beyond this
scale effect, countries with growing population seem to be plagued by less (e.g., Dreher and
Fischer 2010)—and countries with young populations by more terrorism (Tavares 2004;
Urdal 2006).4
Notorious cases of sectarian violence and separatist terrorism suggest that ethnically,
linguistically or religiously fragmented societies are a fertile ground for terrorism. The pre-
ponderance of evidence points indeed to a positive relationship between ethnic/linguistic
fractionalization/tensions and terrorism. In contrast, terrorism seems not to be related to re-
ligious fractionalization/tensions within countries according to the existing literature. Most
of the previous studies analyzing the relationship between ethnicity and terrorism frame
their theoretical arguments in terms of ethnic tensions but test the theories with measures
of ethnic fractionalization. A notable exception is Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010) who
use a measure of ethnic tensions. In the analysis at hand, we follow their lead and use this
theoretically sounder measure. The variable on ethnic tensions has the additional advantage
in our panel setting of being time variant.
Several researchers expect terrorism to be associated with other forms of political vio-
lence, conflicts and wars. First, terrorism can be often a strategy of the weaker belligerent in
asymmetric warfare (both in intra- and interstate conflicts). Second, demonstrations, strikes
and riots may be expressions of the same grievances that provide the background of terror-
ist campaigns. Third, civil wars provide an ideal training ground for prospective terrorists
(Campos and Gassebner 2009). Finally, some observers of terrorism reckon international ter-
rorism to be “someone else’s civil war” (Doran 2002). It is aimed at provoking overreactions
that drive people into the arms of the terrorists. Overall, these conjectures are supported by
the available evidence. Countries with internal conflicts experience and produce more ter-
rorism than other countries (e.g., Campos and Gassebner 2009; Piazza 2007, 2008a; Testas
2004). The evidence for interstate conflicts and wars points in the same direction although
the evidence is somewhat weaker (e.g., Braithwaite and Li 2007; Dreher and Fischer 2010;
Koch and Cranmer 2007; Piazza 2008a; Walsh and Piazza 2010).
In addition to variables capturing political freedoms, economic grievances, demographic
and ethnic factors as well as internal and external conflicts, researchers proposed a large
variety of other potential correlates (see Table 1). But findings that are presented as statisti-
cally significant in the presence of some variables may not be significant in the presence of
other variables proposed by different scholars. Therefore, we suggest testing the bounds of
the significance of all previously considered variables.
4Krueger and Maleckova (2009: 1536) do not find a strong effect of this so called “youth bulge.”
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Table 1 Variables
GDP per capita, log
Definition: log of GDP per capita based on PPP (constant 2005 international $)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Abadie (2006), Azam and Delacroix (2006), Azam and Thelen (2008),
Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010), Berman and Laitin (2008), Blomberg and Hess (2008a, 2008b),
Blomberg and Rosendorff (2009), Blomberg et al. (2004), Braithwaite and Li (2007),
Bravo and Dias (2006)b), Burgoon (2006)b), Campos and Gassebner (2009), Crenshaw et al. (2007),
Dreher and Fischer (2010, 2011), Dreher and Gassebner (2008), Eyerman (1998), Goldstein (2005),
Koch and Cranmer (2007)b), Krueger and Laitin (2008), Krueger and Maleckova (2003),
Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), Lai (2007), Li and Schaub (2004), Li (2005),
Neumayer and Plümper (2009), Piazza (2006, 2008a, 2008b)b), Piazza (2007)a),
Plümper and Neumayer (2010), Robison et al. (2006), Sambanis (2008), Tavares (2004), Testas (2004),
Urdal (2006), Walsh and Piazza (2010)
Partial Democracy/Democracy
Definition: 1 if Freedom House score ≤2.5 (full democracy); 1 if score 3–5 (partial democracy)
Source: Freedom House (2009a)
Proposed by: Abadie (2006)c), Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010), Blomberg and Hess (2008a,
2008b), Blomberg and Rosendorff (2009), Blomberg et al. (2004), Braithwaite and Li (2007),
Bravo and Dias (2006)e), Burgoon (2006), Campos and Gassebner (2009), Crenshaw et al. (2007),
Drakos and Gofas (2006a, 2006b), Dreher and Fischer (2010, 2011), Dreher and Gassebner (2008),
Eubank and Weinberg (2001), Eyerman (1998), Feldmann and Perälä (2004)c), d), Goldstein (2005)c),
Koch and Cranmer (2007), Krueger and Laitin (2008)d), Krueger and Maleckova (2003)d),
Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), Lai (2007), Li and Schaub (2004), Li (2005)e),
Neumayer and Plümper (2009), Piazza (2006, 2007, 2008b), Piazza (2008a)e),
Plümper and Neumayer (2010), Robison et al. (2006)c), d), Sambanis (2008), Tavares (2004)c),
Testas (2004), Urdal (2006), Walsh and Piazza (2010), Weinberg and Eubank (1998)
Population, log
Definition: log of total population
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Azam and Delacroix (2006), Azam and Thelen (2008), Braithwaite and Li (2007),
Burgoon (2006), Campos and Gassebner (2009), Crenshaw et al. (2007), Dreher and Fischer (2010,
2011), Dreher and Gassebner (2008), Eyerman (1998), Koch and Cranmer (2007),
Krueger and Laitin (2008), Krueger and Maleckova (2003), Lai (2007), Li and Schaub (2004),
Li (2005), Neumayer and Plümper (2009), Piazza (2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b),
Plümper and Neumayer (2010), Robison et al. (2006), Sambanis (2008), Urdal (2006),
Walsh and Piazza (2010)
GDP growth
Definition: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices (constant local currency)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Blomberg et al. (2004), Campos and Gassebner (2009), Drakos and Gofas (2006a),
Dreher and Fischer (2010), Dreher and Gassebner (2008), Feldmann and Perälä (2004),
Krueger and Laitin (2008), Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), Li (2005), Piazza (2006), Tavares (2004),
Urdal (2006)
Infant mortality rate
Definition: Infant deaths within the first year per 1000 live births
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), Urdal (2006)
Life expectancy
Definition: Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Drakos and Gofas (2006a)
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Table 1 (part 2)
Telephone
Definition: No. of telephone mainlines (per 100 people)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Lai (2007)
Primary enrollment
Definition: Primary school enrollment (in percent, gross)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006)
Secondary enrollment
Definition: Secondary school enrollment (in percent, gross)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Azam and Thelen (2008), Drakos and Gofas (2006a), Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006)
Tertiary enrollment
Definition: Tertiary school enrollment (in percent, gross)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), Testas (2004)
Literacy rates
Definition: Literates (in percent of adult population)
Source: Vanhanen (2003)
Proposed by: Blomberg and Hess (2008a), Bravo and Dias (2006), Krueger and Maleckova (2003),
Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), Tavares (2004)
Gini coefficient
Definition: Gini coefficient
Source: United Nations University (2008)
Proposed by: Abadie (2006), Feldmann and Perälä (2004), Goldstein (2005), Koch and Cranmer (2007),
Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), Li and Schaub (2004), Li (2005), Piazza (2006)
Globalization
Definition: KOF Index of Globalization
Source: Dreher (2006)
Proposed by: Blomberg and Hess (2008a, 2008b)f), Blomberg and Rosendorff (2009)f),
Braithwaite and Li (2007)f), Bravo and Dias (2006)f), Burgoon (2006)f),
Campos and Gassebner (2009)f), Crenshaw et al. (2007)f), Drakos and Gofas (2006a)f),
Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006)f), Li and Schaub (2004)f), Li (2005)f), Robison et al. (2006)f)
FDI
Definition: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (in percent of GDP)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Li and Schaub (2004), Robison et al. (2006)
Portfolio investment
Definition: Portfolio investment, equity (DRS, current US$)/GDP (current US$)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Li and Schaub (2004)
WTO
Definition: 1 if GATT/WTO membership
Source: http://www.wto.org
Proposed by: Blomberg and Hess (2008b), Blomberg and Rosendorff (2009)
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Table 1 (part 3)
IMF membership
Definition: 1 if IMF membership
Source: http://www.imf.org
Proposed by: Blomberg and Rosendorff (2009)
OECD
Definition: 1 if OECD membership
Source: http://www.oecd.org
Proposed by: Azam and Thelen (2008), Campos and Gassebner (2009), Li and Schaub (2004)
Gvt. consumption
Definition: General government final consumption expenditure (in percent of GDP)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Burgoon (2006), Crenshaw et al. (2007), Robison et al. (2006)
Transfers
Definition: Transfers of income between residents of the reporting country and the rest of the world that
carry no provisions for repayment (in percent of GDP)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Burgoon (2006), Crenshaw et al. (2007)
Social contributions
Definition: Social contributions (in percent of revenue)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Burgoon (2006), Crenshaw et al. (2007)
Education spending
Definition: Public spending on education, total (in percent of GDP)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: This paper
Economic freedom
Definition: Fraser Economic Freedom Index
Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2008)
Proposed by: Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010), Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), Piazza (2008b)
Aid
Definition: Official development assistance and official aid (in percent of GDP)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Azam and Delacroix (2006), Azam and Thelen (2008), Campos and Gassebner (2009),
Neumayer and Plümper (2009)
Fuel exports
Definition: Fuel exports
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Sambanis (2008)
Primary goods exports
Definition: Agricultural raw materials, food, and ores and metal exports (in percent of merchandise
exports)
Source: World Bank (2009), own calculation
Proposed by: Bravo and Dias (2006), Tavares (2004)
Female labor
Definition: Female labor participation rate (in percent of female population ages >14)
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Table 1 (part 4)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Robison et al. (2006)
Unemployment rate
Definition: Unemployment rate
Source: International Labour Office (2009)
Proposed by: Feldmann and Perälä (2004), Goldstein (2005), Piazza (2006)
Inflation
Definition: GDP deflator (base year varies by country)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Feldmann and Perälä (2004), Piazza (2006)
Urbanization
Definition: Urban population (in percent of total)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Campos and Gassebner (2009), Robison et al. (2006), Tavares (2004)
Population growth
Definition: Population growth (annual in percent)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Dreher and Fischer (2010), Dreher and Gassebner (2008), Piazza (2006)
Youth bulge
Definition: Population ages 15–25 (in percent of population ages >14)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau: International Data Base
Proposed by: Tavares (2004)g), Urdal (2006)
Ethnic tensions
Definition: Degree of tension attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions. Higher values
indicate more tensions
Source: International Country Risk Guide
Proposed by: Abadie (2006)h), i), Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010), Blomberg and Hess (2008a)i),
Bravo and Dias (2006)h), Drakos and Gofas (2006a), Dreher and Fischer (2010)h), i),
Goldstein (2005)h), i), Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006)h), i), Lai (2007), Piazza (2006)h), Piazza (2008a)i),
Sambanis (2008)h), Tavares (2004)h)
Religious tensions
Definition: Suppression of religious freedom. Higher values indicate more tensions
Source: International Country Risk Guide
Proposed by: Abadie (2006)j), Blomberg and Hess (2008a, 2008b)j), Dreher and Fischer (2010)j),
Goldstein (2005)j), Piazza (2006, 2008a)j), Tavares (2004)j)
Fiscal decentralization
Definition: Subnational expenditure share (in percent of total expenditures)
Source: IMF Governments Finance Statistics
Proposed by: Dreher and Fischer (2010, 2011)
Plurality voting system
Definition: 1 if legislative elections based on first-past-the-post
Source: Beck et al. (2001)
Proposed by: Li (2005)
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Table 1 (part 5)
Proportional voting system
Definition: 1 if legislative elections based on proportional representation
Source: Beck et al. (2001)
Proposed by: Li (2005)
Mixed voting system
Definition: 1 if legislature filled through mixed election rules
Source: Beck et al. (2001)
Proposed by: Li (2005)
Empowerment rights
Definition: Index comprising freedom of movement, speech, and religion as well as worker’s rights and
political participation. Higher values indicate less human rights abuses
Source: Cingranelli and Richards (2006)
Proposed by: Feldmann and Perälä (2004)
Physical integrity
Definition: Index comprising torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance.
Higher values indicate less human rights abuses
Source: Cingranelli and Richards (2006)
Proposed by: Feldmann and Perälä (2004), Walsh and Piazza (2010)
Freedom of the press
Definition: Index quantifying the freedom of the press. Higher values indicate less press freedom
Source: Freedom House (2009b)
Proposed by: Li (2005)
Law and order
Definition: Strength and impartiality of the legal system as well as of the popular observance of the law.
High values indicate more respect for law and order
Source: International Country Risk Guide
Proposed by: This paper
Military in politics
Definition: Military participation in government. Higher values indicate less military involvement
Source: International Country Risk Guide
Proposed by: This paper
Military leader
Definition: 1 if the chief executive is a military officer
Source: Beck et al. (2001)
Proposed by: This paper
Government fractionalization
Definition: Probability that two randomly chosen deputies from among the government parties will be of
different parties
Source: Beck et al. (2001)
Proposed by: Dreher and Fischer (2010, 2011), Dreher and Gassebner (2008), Koch and Cranmer (2007),
Piazza (2006)
Opposition fractionalization
Definition: Probability that two randomly chosen deputies belonging to the opposition parties will be of
different parties
Source: Beck et al. (2001)
Proposed by: Dreher and Fischer (2010), Piazza (2006)
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Table 1 (part 6)
Left government
Definition: 1 if party of the chief executive is communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing
Source: Beck et al. (2001)
Proposed by: Burgoon (2006), Crenshaw et al. (2007), Koch and Cranmer (2007)
Right government
Definition: 1 if party of the chief executive is conservative, Christian democratic, or rightwing
Source: Beck et al. (2001)
Proposed by: Koch and Cranmer (2007)
Centrist government
Definition: 1 if party of the chief executive is centrist
Source: Beck et al. (2001)
Proposed by: Koch and Cranmer (2007)
Regime durability
Definition: No. of years since most recent regime change (three point change in the Polity IV score over
a period of three years or less)
Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2002)
Proposed by: Campos and Gassebner (2009), Li (2005), Piazza (2007, 2008a, 2008b)
Demonstrations
Definition: Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or
voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly
anti-foreign nature
Source: Databanks International (2005)
Proposed by: Campos and Gassebner (2009)
Strikes
Definition: Any strike of 1000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one
employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority
Source: Databanks International (2005)
Proposed by: Campos and Gassebner (2009)
Riots
Definition: Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical
force
Source: Databanks International (2005)
Proposed by: Campos and Gassebner (2009)
Guerrilla war
Definition: Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or
irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime
Source: Databanks International (2005)
Proposed by: Campos and Gassebner (2009)
Interstate war
Definition: 1 if war between two or more states with at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year
Source: UCDP/PRIO Conflict Database
Proposed by: Braithwaite and Li (2007), Burgoon (2006), Crenshaw et al. (2007),
Dreher and Fischer (2010), Koch and Cranmer (2007), Lai (2007), Li and Schaub (2004), Li (2005),
Piazza (2008a), Walsh and Piazza (2010)
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Table 1 (part 7)
Internal war
Definition: 1 if war between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without
intervention from other states with at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year
Source: UCDP/PRIO Conflict Database
Proposed by: Campos and Gassebner (2009), Lai (2007), Piazza (2007, 2008a, 2008b), Testas (2004),
Walsh and Piazza (2010)
Internationalized internal war
Definition: 1 if war between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with intervention
from other states with at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year
Source: UCDP/PRIO Conflict Database
Proposed by: Campos and Gassebner (2009), Lai (2007), Piazza (2007, 2008a, 2008b), Testas (2004),
Walsh and Piazza (2010)
International organizations
Definition: No. of international organizations in which a country participates
Source: Dreher (2006)
Proposed by: Bravo and Dias (2006)
No of embassies
Definition: No. of embassies in the country
Source: Dreher (2006)
Proposed by: Bravo and Dias (2006)
Political proximity to U.S.
Definition: Share of votes in the UN General Assembly which is cast in line with the United States (i.e.,
sum of votes in line with United States divided by total votes in a year; abstentions/absences treated
as 0.5)
Source: Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009)
Proposed by: Campos and Gassebner (2009), Dreher and Fischer (2010, 2011),
Dreher and Gassebner (2008)
Military personnel
Definition: Armed forces personnel (in percent of total labor force)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Braithwaite and Li (2007)k), Burgoon (2006)k), Crenshaw et al. (2007),
Koch and Cranmer (2007)k), Li and Schaub (2004)k), Li (2005)k)
Military expenditures
Definition: Military expenditure (in percent of GDP)
Source: World Bank (2009)
Proposed by: Braithwaite and Li (2007)k), Burgoon (2006)k), Crenshaw et al. (2007),
Koch and Cranmer (2007)k), Li and Schaub (2004)k), Li (2005)k)
Arms exports
Definition: Arms imports (in percent of merchandise imports)
Source: World Bank (2009), own calculation
Proposed by: Neumayer and Plümper (2009)
Arms imports
Definition: Arms exports (in percent of merchandise exports)
Source: World Bank (2009), own calculation
Proposed by: Neumayer and Plümper (2009)
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Table 1 (part 8)
State sponsor
Definition: Countries determined by the U.S. Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism
Source: U.S. Department of State
Proposed by: Lai (2007)
a) Total GDP; b) variable is part of composite indicators human development index or gvt. capability; c) po-
litical rights; d) civil liberties; e) other variable such as executive constraint, pluralism, reg. of political part.
or other; f) globalization is measured as openness ((X + M)/GDP); g) population ages <15; h) ethnic frac-
tionalization; i) linguistic fractionalization; j) religious fractionalization; k) variable is part of the composite
indicator gvt. capability
3 Empirical method
As the literature overview has well documented there is a large set of studies that investigate
the determinants of terrorism which produced a long list of potential explanatory variables.
Studies often restrict their analysis to certain subsets of these variables and frequently ignore
the effects of any omitted variable bias when other variables are not included. Moreover, us-
ing alternative sources of terror data might yield different conclusions regarding the impact
of certain variables. In addition to any model uncertainty, the limited number of observations
often restricts the power of statistical tests that rule out irrelevant explanatory variables.
In order to address these issues we use extreme bounds analysis (EBA), as proposed
by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992). EBA enables us to identify explanatory
variables that are robustly related to the three different terrorism measures we use. It is a
relatively neutral way of coping with the problem of selecting variables for an empirical
model in situations where there are conflicting or inconclusive suggestions in the litera-
ture. Originally, EBA was introduced in the economic growth literature (e.g., Leamer 1983;
Levine and Renelt 1992; Sala-i-Martin 1997; Sturm and de Haan 2005). In recent years its
use has expanded to other fields where there is no clear consensus about which variables
belong in a “true” model. Recent examples of topics subjected to the EBA procedure in-
clude the determinants of corruption (Serra 2006), life satisfaction (Bjørnskov et al. 2008),
democracy (Gassebner et al. 2011) and R&D investment (Wang 2010).
To conduct an EBA, equations of the following general form are estimated
Y = βMM + βFF + βZZ + υ, (1)
where Y is the dependent variable, M is a vector of “commonly accepted” explanatory
variables and F is a vector containing the variables of interest. The vector Z contains up
to three possible additional explanatory variables (as in Levine and Renelt 1992) which,
according to the broader literature, are related to the dependent variable. The error term is υ .
The EBA test for variable F states that if the lower extreme bound for βF —i.e., the smallest
value for βF minus two standard deviations—is negative, while the upper extreme bound for
βF —i.e., the largest value for βF plus two standard deviations—is positive, the variable F
is not robustly related to Y . This basically means that all coefficients in all regressions run
need to be statistically significant with a coefficient of the same sign.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that the testing criterion proposed by Leamer (1983) and
Levine and Renelt (1992) is far too strong for any variable to pass it. If the distribution of
the parameter of interest has both positive and negative support, then a researcher is bound
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to find at least one regression model for which the estimated coefficient turns out to be
statistically insignificant if enough regressions are run. Consequently, in what follows we
concentrate not on the extreme bounds, but rather on the percentage of the regressions in
which the coefficient of the variable F is statistically different from zero. Moreover, in-
stead of analyzing only the extreme bounds of the estimates of the coefficient of a particular
variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) suggestion and analyze the entire distribution.
Accordingly, we also report the median parameter estimate of βF and its cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF). The latter represents the proportion of the cumulative distribution
function lying on each side of zero. CDF identifies the larger of the areas under the density
function either above or below zero, i.e., whether this happens to be CDF or 1 − CDF. So
CDF always lies between 0.5 and 1.0. However, in contrast to Sala-i-Martin, we use the un-
weighted, instead of the weighted, CDF.5 As an alternative to the original criterion proposed
by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997) suggests considering
a variable to be robust if the CDF criterion is greater than 0.9.
Another objection to EBA is that the initial partition of variables into the M and in the Z
vector is likely to be arbitrary. However, as pointed out by Temple (2000), there is no reason
why standard model selection procedures (such as testing down from a general specification)
cannot be used in advance to identify variables that are particularly relevant. Furthermore,
some variables are included in the large majority of studies and are by now common in this
branch of the literature.
In our view, the inclusion of GDP per capita, population size, and a measure for democ-
racy in the M vector is the minimal commonly agreed set in the literature. The role of
GDP per capita has been widely and controversially discussed. As our dependent vari-
able is an unscaled count variable, it seems necessary to control for differences in pop-
ulation sizes. Moreover, the role of democracy is also at the center of the discussion.
In particular many studies call for a non-linear effect of democracy. To accommodate
this we incorporate two dummy variables for partial and full democracies with full au-
tocracies being the reference group. While it is tempting to include a larger set of vari-
ables in the M matrix, we restrict ourselves to the variables the inclusion of which is
indeed basically uncontested in the literature. Moreover, in line with the bulk of the lit-
erature we include annual time fixed effects in all our regressions to control for com-
mon shocks and the cyclical behavior of terrorism (on the latter see, e.g., Im et al. 1987;
Enders et al. 1992; Enders and Sandler 1999, 2006b). The F vector contains 62 variables
(see Table 1) one at a time. In order to test one particular variable, combinations of the
remaining 61 variables form the Z vector. After calculating the relevant statistics the next
variable serves as the F vector and the previously tested variable goes into the Z vector.
As mentioned before all our dependent variables are count variables. Many countries in
the world experience little terrorism or have few citizens who engage in terrorism; some
countries, however, are exposed to many terror events. Thus all our terrorism measures ex-
hibit over-dispersion, i.e., their variances are larger than their means. This calls for a negative
binomial estimator. Moreover, we employ panel data and, as mentioned above, terrorism is
distributed quite unequally across the globe. We therefore employ a conditional fixed ef-
fects negative binomial estimator. Following Hausman et al. (1984), if the joint probability
5Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes using the integrated likelihood function to construct a weighted CDF. How-
ever, missing observations for some of the variables pose a problem. Sturm and de Haan (2002) show that
the goodness-of-fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and
that the weights constructed in this way are not invariant to linear transformations of the dependent variable.
Hence, changing scales could result in different outcomes and conclusions. We therefore restrict our attention
to the unweighted version.
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is conditioned on the observed sum of counts (i.e., all observed terror occurrences) for each
country then the conditional log likelihood function takes the following form:
lnL =
n∑
i=1
[
ln
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Ti∑
t=1
e(β
′Xit )
)
+ ln
(
Ti∑
t=1
yit + 1
)
− ln
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Ti∑
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yit
)
+
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{
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(
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) − ln(e(β ′Xit )) − ln(yit + 1)
}
]
. (2)
where  is the gamma distribution. The country specific effect drops out by conditioning on
the sum of the counts of the dependent variable. The coefficients can be obtained by standard
maximization of the log likelihood.
The list of all variables, their definitions, sources, and the studies proposing them is
given in Table 1. We do not include two widely used composite indicators, the UN devel-
opment index and the government capability index. Both indices combine GDP per capita
with a large number of other variables. The weights of these indicators are arbitrary and
have controversial implications. For example, combining GDP per capita in logarithms with
life expectancy in levels implicitly values gains in life expectancy in rich countries as worth
much more than an identical gain in life expectancy in poor countries. Therefore, we pre-
fer to include the constitutive parts of these indicators separately. However, we do include
composite indicators, such as the KOF Index of Globalization, that use more advanced ag-
gregation procedures such as principal component analysis.
For the dependent variable we employ the three most commonly used datasets on ter-
rorism: ITERATE, GTD, and MIPT. The ITERATE dataset is maybe the most often used
dataset on transnational terrorism. It is based on published reports of transnational terror-
ist incidents found in print and electronic media. We use the version updated through 2005
taken from Mickolus et al. (2006).6 While ITERATE is the oldest of the commonly used
dataset, the Global Terrorism Database GTD, one of the newest datasets is catching up
ground.7 This stems from the fact that it is available without monetary costs. Moreover, it
differs from the ITERATE dataset as it combines domestic with transnational terrorism. It
does not enable the researcher to separate the two forms of terror.8 Finally, we use the Memo-
rial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base dataset.9
6ITERATE defines terrorism as “the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extranormal violence for
political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental
authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the
immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature
of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national
boundaries” (Mickolus et al. 2006).
7Available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. The Global Terrorism Database defines terror as “the threatened
or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social
goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/usinggtd/). From 1998 onwards
two of the following three criteria had to be fulfilled to be counted as an act of terror: (a) The violent act was
aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; (b) The violent act included evidence of an
intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than
the immediate victims; and (c) The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law.
8Enders et al. (2011) analytically separate the terror events reported in the GTD into domestic and transna-
tional terror events.
9The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base defines terrorism as “violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to
create an atmosphere of fear and alarm.” The focus of terrorism is to discourage the opposition from acting
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This was once one of the most popular datasets (as it also was offered without monetary
costs) but ceased operation on March 31, 2008.10 Due to the many studies which have used
this dataset we include it in our analysis, nonetheless. To ensure comparability with the pre-
vious studies we chose 1980—the median start year of the 43 studies—as the initial year for
our empirical analysis. Our results have thus little to say on the determinants of the leftist
terrorism of the 1970s.11
4 Results
4.1 Locations of terrorism
We present our results in a compact way in Table 2. We only report variables that passed
Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) criterion of being considered a robust variable, i.e., a CDF of 0.9 or
higher, at least in one measure of terrorism. The complete results are reported in Table A1
in the Appendix.
Two variables appear to be robust across all three measures: the index measuring physi-
cal integrity rights and (absence of) religious tensions. Three variables pass the robustness
criterion twice, the population size (which is one of the base variables), economic freedom,
and the infant mortality rate, while 13 additional variables pass the test in one terror measure
only. We have marked the CDFs above 0.9 in bold face to enable the reader to get a quick
overview.
According to the results in Table 2, law and order—the strength and impartiality of the
legal system—and physical integrity rights—the absence of human rights abuses—are as-
sociated with less terrorism. These results contribute to the debate of permissive versus
preventive factors of democracy. One view holds that impartiality and respect of human
rights enables terrorism, the other view contends that a partisan legal system and human
rights violations create grievances and provoke political violence. The results reported in
Table 2 are consistent with the latter view. However, law and order also measures popular
observance of the law and human rights violations may be the result rather than the cause of
terrorism (Dreher et al. 2010). Therefore, the possibility of reverse causality prevents strong
conclusions.
The robust and negative relationship between infant mortality and the occurrence of ter-
rorism defies the popular view that terrorism is rooted in poverty. Our results suggest that it
is not so much the lack of material resources that is important for terrorism but rather the lack
of economic opportunities: Countries that restrict economic freedom experience more ter-
rorism. Somewhat surprisingly and in contrast to the majority of previously reported results,
we find that financial globalization measured by foreign portfolio investments is positively
correlated with terrorism. Urbanization is positively associated with terrorism. This finding
is in accordance with much of the earlier literature—both empirical and theoretical. Cities
provide an abundance of targets and attacks in cities are more likely to get media coverage
than attacks in sparsely populated rural areas.
with free will. The motives for engaging in terrorism are political, while the acts themselves are generally
conducted in a way that will achieve maximum publicity.
10Since 2009 a successor database called the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents is available.
11We have replicated our results using all available observations and using an alternative GDP PPP measure
(from Penn World Tables). Our results remain virtually unchanged.
Public Choice (2011) 149:235–261 251
Table 2 Main results for locations of terrorism
Variable Location, ITERATE Location, GTD Location, MIPT
Coef. CDF % sig. Coef. CDF % sig. Coef. CDF % sig.
Baseline variables
GDP per capita, log 0.103 0.681 39.6 0.210 0.894 73.4 0.063 0.628 27.6
Population, log 0.142 0.837 62.3 0.221 0.984 93.7 0.177 0.902 68.8
Democracy 0.059 0.550 23.7 0.191 0.646 48.9 −0.065 0.537 14.7
Partial democracy 0.035 0.542 20.9 0.225 0.726 53.0 −0.017 0.523 10.2
Robust variables
Physical integrity −0.138 0.979 92.1 −0.165 0.970 90.8 −0.099 0.914 73.5
Religious tension 0.103 0.934 80.6 0.121 0.986 96.3 0.069 0.918 74.6
Economic freedom −0.307 0.948 80.0 −0.269 0.949 83.0 −0.327 0.899 71.7
Infant mortality −0.017 0.910 67.2 −0.010 0.903 64.1 −0.008 0.699 22.4
Ethnic tensions −0.007 0.544 18.4 0.040 0.911 63.1 0.011 0.627 15.2
Gvt. fractionalization 0.450 0.867 64.9 0.420 0.919 73.5 0.411 0.852 60.8
Guerrilla war 0.208 0.877 65.7 0.370 0.990 96.0 0.182 0.893 62.3
Internal war 0.086 0.839 46.5 0.264 0.987 95.6 0.112 0.856 62.4
Internat. internal war 0.028 0.624 6.5 0.147 0.933 69.6 0.059 0.735 14.0
Law and order 0.002 0.538 11.6 −0.072 0.960 82.3 −0.059 0.882 62.8
Military expenditures 0.027 0.701 29.1 0.079 0.935 79.8 0.015 0.625 17.2
Military personnel 0.041 0.791 32.2 0.077 0.923 73.1 0.025 0.691 21.5
OECD −0.108 0.600 14.2 0.407 0.914 68.4 0.137 0.661 11.0
Portfolio investment 1.029 0.743 7.4 0.037 0.539 1.8 2.877 0.963 80.4
Proximity to U.S. 1.266 0.813 42.8 1.481 0.905 72.0 0.969 0.795 34.6
Strikes 0.068 0.810 37.6 0.126 0.906 75.5 0.088 0.897 53.1
Urbanization 0.015 0.856 62.7 0.005 0.716 42.3 0.023 0.913 77.5
Note: The table reports the median parameter estimates (Coef.), the cumulative distribution function (CDF),
i.e. the proportion of the cumulative distribution function lying on each side of zero, and the percent the
estimate was statistically significant at the 5% level (% sig.). The criterion to consider a variable robustly
related to terrorism is a CDF above 0.9 which is printed in bold face
Several researchers expect ethnically and religiously diverse societies as well as ethnic
and religious tensions to provide fertile ground for terrorism (see Sect. 2 and Table 1). Our
results suggest that this is indeed the case. In line with most of the previous evidence we
find religious and ethnic tensions to have a positive effect on the number of terrorist attacks
in a country and year.
Terrorism is also related to other forms of political violence and internal conflicts such as
strikes, guerrilla war as well as internal and internationalized internal wars, i.e., civil wars.
These findings are consistent with the notions that other forms of political violence are an ex-
pression of the same underlying grievances, that civil wars provide fertile training ground for
terrorists, and that terrorism is the strategy of the weaker belligerent in asymmetric warfare.
The robust association between terrorism and military personnel and expenditures points in
the same direction.
Many studies find that “the Western World” is often the victim of terrorism because it is
rich and influential. Our results confirm this notion as we find OECD member countries to
be attacked more often.
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Related to the above is the notion that the United States is a prime target because of the
values it represents particularly attracting fundamental terrorism. This is nicely summarized
by Zakaria (2004): “What worries people around the world above all else is living in a
world shaped and dominated by one country—the [United States].” Thus if a government
sides with the United States it also puts itself at risk. In the literature this is operationalized
by the voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. Savun and Philips (2009) generalize
this idea by showing that involvement in foreign policy predicts transnational terror attacks.
According to the EBA voting in line with the United States indeed triggers terror attacks.
Domestic political struggles and resulting social cleavages might translate into an in-
creased level of terror when the struggles escalate. This transmission channel has been doc-
umented by several studies and is confirmed by our results.
There are interesting differences in the patterns of robustness across different datasets. In
particular, ethnic tensions and OECD membership are robustly associated only with terror-
ism for GTD. To a lesser extent, this is also the case for other forms of political violence,
military power, government fractionalization and political proximity to the United States.
These differences are consistent with the notion that ethnic tensions, political struggles and
social cleavages are much more important for domestic rather than transnational terrorism.
GTD measures both forms of terrorism, while ITERATE and MIPT focus exclusively on
transnational terrorism.12 Other differences between the datasets may also contribute to the
discrepancies in the results. For example, ITERATE excludes attacks against combatants
and military targets in wars, major military interventions, and military occupations; GTD
includes them. Hence, exploiting disparities between domestic and transnational terrorism
as well as across datasets seems to be a promising avenue for future research (see Enders
et al. 2011 for a thorough comparison of the datasets and a decomposition of the GTD data
into domestic and transnational terror incidents).
As the previous discussion made clear, there are some robust correlates of terrorism.
However, the most striking of our findings is that the majority of the variables suggested in
the literature do not survive EBA. Our approach is pretty extreme and is important to reit-
erate four caveats: Our results do not necessarily invalidate theories of terrorism associated
with other variables or empirical strategies. The lack of robustness may result from the use
of poor proxies, the inclusion of “bad controls,” inconsistencies associated with endogenous
regressors, or restriction to reduced form estimations.
4.2 Victims and perpetrators
The main results for the victim- and perpetrator-regressions are reported in Table 3, the
complete results can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. Note that the perpetrator is not
identified in GTD but only in ITERATE.
Overall, the set of robust variables in regressions on victim- and perpetrator-countries is
not too different than regressions on terror-locations. Among the baseline variables popula-
tion size and to a lesser extent GDP per capita are again robustly associated with terrorism.
Given the great deal of intellectual resources invested in research on the relationship
between terrorism and democracy, one of the most important finding is the lack of a robust
relationship between terrorism and democracy. From a theoretical perspective, there are
two countervailing effects of democracy on terrorism. Democracy lowers the direct costs of
engaging in terrorist activities but increases its relative costs. Moreover, existing empirical
12MIPT tracks domestic terrorism from 1998 onward. We focus on transnational terrorism only to ensure
comparability with ITERATE.
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Table 3 Main results for victims and perpetrators of terrorism
Variable Victim, ITERATE Victim, GTD Perpetrator, ITERATE
Coef. CDF % sig. Coef. CDF % sig. Coef. CDF % sig.
Baseline variables
GDP per capita, log 0.304 0.852 58.5 0.371 0.957 87.9 −0.020 0.528 21.0
Population, log 0.307 0.965 90.0 0.247 0.990 96.6 0.111 0.774 38.8
Democracy −0.111 0.599 10.6 −0.018 0.512 40.1 −0.327 0.755 37.9
Partial Democracy −0.196 0.741 21.7 0.041 0.556 29.1 −0.110 0.629 23.3
Robust variables
Economic freedom −0.313 0.938 83.3 −0.202 0.914 73.0 −0.374 0.954 82.1
Internat. internal war 0.188 0.963 85.1 0.134 0.927 70.3 0.169 0.906 60.5
Physical integrity −0.101 0.969 85.2 −0.137 0.935 82.4 −0.198 0.985 93.5
Guerrilla war 0.098 0.766 28.2 0.366 0.993 97.2 0.325 0.935 77.5
Internal war 0.170 0.930 73.7 0.270 0.987 95.1 0.126 0.874 59.7
Telephone 0.006 0.720 16.9 0.019 0.934 80.7 −0.026 0.904 72.8
Centrist government 0.117 0.783 30.2 −0.069 0.721 20.8 0.294 0.936 63.0
Ethnic tensions −0.007 0.582 7.5 0.039 0.909 65.2 −0.006 0.527 12.5
Military expenditures 0.026 0.643 10.5 0.074 0.917 78.5 0.028 0.648 18.5
OECD −0.345 0.789 33.0 0.717 0.976 90.4 −0.329 0.729 28.1
Proximity to U.S. 0.854 0.758 28.6 2.233 0.968 88.8 1.377 0.801 38.9
Primary goods exports −0.006 0.786 34.4 −0.007 0.930 72.7 0.001 0.536 10.6
Religious tensions 0.063 0.841 62.5 0.124 0.987 96.7 0.071 0.858 58.3
Youth bulge −4.604 0.830 58.5 −4.504 0.930 78.9 1.398 0.619 26.1
Note: The table reports the median parameter estimates (Coef.), the cumulative distribution function (CDF),
i.e. the proportion of the cumulative distribution function lying on each side of zero, and the percent the
estimate was statistically significant at the 5% level (% sig.). The criterion to consider a variable robustly
related to terrorism is a CDF above 0.9 which is printed in bold face
evidence is also conflicting with some studies reporting negative, some positive and some
nonlinear effects (see Sect. 2). Our results show why this is the case. The CDFs are often
close to 0.5, which implies that the coefficient estimates are distributed with mean zero. At
the same time, there is a relatively high percentage of statistically significant coefficients—at
least for some dependent variables and datasets. Thus, either statistically significant positive
or statistically significant negative relationships between democracy and terrorism can be
found with the appropriate set of controls.
The findings for five (groups of) variables closely resemble the results for the regressions
using the location-aspect of terrorism. First, there is a very robust negative relationship be-
tween economic freedom and terrorism. Second, respect for physical integrity rights goes
hand in hand with low levels of terrorism. Third, terrorism is closely associated with other
forms of conflicts such as civil and guerrilla wars. Again, the positive relationship between
military expenditures and terrorism points in the same direction. Fourth, ethnic and reli-
gious tensions are positively related to terrorism. Finally, citizens from Western countries,
i.e., OECD members and countries politically close to the United States, are more likely
to be victimized by terrorism. The results for ethnic and religious tensions, military expen-
ditures, as well as for OECD membership and political proximity to the United States are
slightly less robust in estimates based on the ITERATE dataset.
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In comparison with the results reported in Table 2, a couple of new results emerge from
Table 3. First, in contrast to what might be expected from the natural resource curse liter-
ature, fewer attacks against citizens from a country occur, the larger the share of primary
goods among the country’s exports. Second, citizens from countries with a large share of
young people are less likely to be victimized and, importantly, not more likely to commit
attacks. Especially the latter result contradicts the literature on “youth bulge”. Third, the
number of telephone mainlines in a country is negatively associated with the number of at-
tacks perpetrated by citizens of that country. On the one hand, this result may be regarded
as evidence for the conjecture that terrorism is rooted in economic grievances and poor de-
velopment. On the other hand, the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by citizens of a
particular country is less robustly but positively associated with other common indicators of
development such as infant health, life expectancy, literacy rates, and primary and secondary
school enrollment (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Finally, more terrorist attacks are perpe-
trated by citizens from countries with centrist governments that from country-years under
left- or right-wing regimes. This finding is rather unexpected. In our estimation sample about
45% of the perpetrators are active under centrist governments. Greece, Portugal, Spain, and
Sri Lanka seem to be of particular importance for this result. Yet the results are not driven by
individual countries. If we repeatedly run regressions with excluding one country at a time,
the coefficient estimates for centrist governments are relatively stable and range from 0.134
(without Portugal) to 0.238 (without Mozambique).
5 Conclusions
Terrorism has substantial costs, both economic (e.g., Frey et al. 2007, 2009; Gaibulloev and
Sandler 2008; Enders 2007; Sandler and Enders 2008; Llussa and Tavares 2011) as well as
political (e.g., Gassebner et al. 2008, 2012). Therefore, in many countries the fight against
terrorism is one of the top priorities on the political agenda. Two different strategies can be
pursued in the fight against terrorism. One is to address the root causes of terrorism, another
to treat its symptoms with specific counterterrorism measures. Scientific evidence can guide
political decision makers in both cases. There is a small but important strand of literature
assessing specific counterterrorism measures (e.g., Landes 1978; Enders et al. 1990a, 1990b;
Enders and Sandler 1993; Sandler et al. 2011). A much larger strand of literature investigates
conditions at the level of societies and countries that are conducive to terrorism. This strand
of the literature can potentially inform policies aiming at curing the root causes. It is this
second strand of the literature that we assessed in this paper.
Our systematic robustness analysis of previous findings yields some important policy
implications. Among the most important findings are two non-results. First, terrorist ac-
tivity is not robustly associated with the degree of democracy. What is more, our esti-
mate lay bare the reason behind the conflicting results presented in the previous litera-
ture. For most datasets and aspects of terrorism, coefficient estimates are distributed with
a mean close to zero. At the same time, the estimated coefficients turn out to be statisti-
cally significantly different from zero relatively often. Thus, either statistically significant
positive or statistically significant negative relationships between democracy and terrorism
can be found with the appropriate set of controls. Second, economic development as mea-
sured by GDP per capita does not matter for the amount of terrorism. This finding mir-
rors research analyzing the socioeconomic background of terrorists which finds little evi-
dence that the typical terrorist is poor (e.g., Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Berrebi 2007;
Krueger 2007). There is some conflicting evidence for other measures of development.
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While infant mortality is negatively associated with the number of attacks occurring in a
country and year, the number of telephone mainlines is also negatively related to the num-
ber of attacks perpetrated by citizens from a particular country. However, the preponderance
of evidence suggests that the level of economic development is of minor importance at best.
However, there is a very robust negative relationship between the degree of economic
freedom and terrorism. Thus, more important than the level of development are economic
opportunities.
According to our analysis, a strong and impartial judicial system and respect of physical
integrity rights are associated with low levels of terrorism. This suggests that the widely
purported trade-off between respecting human rights and countering terrorism may be non-
existent. However, because of the obvious possibility of reverse causality, this interpretation
has to be taken with a grain of salt.
A number of robust correlates of terrorism emerge from our analysis. Some can be a
guideline for policy measures to counter terrorism, however, many are beyond governments’
control. The prevention of civil and guerrilla wars and other forms of conflict as well as a
reduction of ethnic and religious tensions are all worthy goals irrespective of their effect on
the level of terrorism. Similarly, few will seriously consider sacrificing Western values in
the name of security.
We probed the robustness of previous findings on the determinants of terrorism along
three dimensions: aspects of terrorism, datasets and set of control variables. Our results have
several implications for future research in this area. First, our analysis uncovers some truly
robust correlates of terrorism. Yet, additional theoretical and empirical studies are needed to
clarify issues of causality and underlying mechanisms. Second, our analysis demonstrates
just how sensitive are the existing empirical results. Therefore, systematic robustness tests
are warranted in future research on the determinants of terrorism. Our results suggest a set
of variables that belongs in all analyses of robustness. Third, previous studies differ along
additional dimensions than the ones considered here, such as alternative measures of ter-
rorism, domestic versus transnational terrorism, and time periods. It is worth studying how
choices along these dimensions influence results. Some authors suggest using measures of
terrorism that reflect the severity of attacks (e.g., number of casualties). Severe attacks may
be associated with factors other than those that explain less severe ones. Our analysis does
not speak to this issue. Or, differences may exist between the determinants of domestic ver-
sus transnational terrorism. The sharp contrast between the results based on GTD, which
combines domestic and transnational terrorist incidents and results based on the other two
datasets focusing on transnational terrorism points in this direction. The decomposition of
the GTD data into domestic and transnational terrorism by Enders et al. (2011) and other
datasets including domestic terrorism provide a means of tackling this important issue. Sim-
ilarly, time may matter. For example, Enders and Sandler (2000) show that the rise of re-
ligious terrorism after the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979 and the end of
the Cold War in 1991 substantially changed the nature of terrorism. In the same vein, Ba-
suchoudhary and Shughart (2010) provide evidence consistent with the notion terrorism is
influenced by different factors during and after the Cold War.
In sum, there are a number of intriguing questions left for future research. We hope that
the analysis presented in this article provides a solid foundation on which future research on
the determinants of terrorism can build.
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